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Today’s cyber-physical systems face various impediments to achieving their intended goals, namely, communication uncertainties
and faults, relative to the increased integration of networked and wireless devices, hinder the synchronism needed to meet real-time
deadlines. Moreover, being critical, these systems are also exposed to significant security threats. This threat combination increases
the risk of physical damage. This paper addresses these problems by studying how to build the first real-time Byzantine reliable
broadcast protocol (RTBRB) tolerating network uncertainties, faults, and attacks. Previous literature describes either real-time
reliable broadcast protocols, or asynchronous (non real-time) Byzantine ones.
We first prove that it is impossible to implement RTBRB using traditional distributed computing paradigms, e.g., where the
error/failure detection mechanisms of processes are decoupled from the broadcast algorithm itself, even with the help of the most
powerful failure detectors. We circumvent this impossibility by proposing RT-ByzCast, an algorithm based on aggregating digital
signatures in a sliding time-window and on empowering processes with self-crashing capabilities to mask and bound losses. We show
that RT-ByzCast (i) operates in real-time by proving that messages broadcast by correct processes are delivered within a known
bounded delay, and (ii) is reliable by demonstrating that correct processes using our algorithm crash themselves with a negligible
probability, even with message loss rates as high as 60%.
Index Terms—real-time distributed systems; probabilistic losses; reliable broadcast; byzantine behavior; intrusion tolerant;
I. INTRODUCTION
Many of today’s physical structures are governed by auto-
mated operations that are typically conducted and controlled
by multiple sensing, computing, and communication devices.
Generally, such physical structures including their distributed
control are known as cyber-physical systems (CPS) [1]. In
this paper, we address two problems relevant to modern
CPS, found for example in large continuous process plants,
manufacturing shop-floors, or power grid installations.
The increasing integration of sensors and actuators, net-
worked and often wireless [2]–[5], as well as their scale,
introduce uncertainties and faults in communication, which
hamper the necessary synchronism to meet real-time deadlines,
fundamental for various CPS applications [3]–[6].
Worse, most of those processes are in essence critical infras-
tructures. Hence, they are likely to be targeted by motivated
attackers [7], [8], to impact the timeliness of communications
— for example by maliciously worsening the impact of the
above mentioned uncertainties and faults — and the sheer
correctness of messages. These two facets create a completely
new scenario, where the traditional approach to building real-
time communication no longer works. The consequences of
system failure can range from loss of availability to physi-
cal damage.
In this paper, we simultaneously address the three threats
— uncertainty, faults, and attacks — introducing RT-ByzCast,
to the best of our knowledge the first Byzantine-resilient real-
time reliable broadcast protocol. Previous literature on fault-
tolerance contains either real-time reliable broadcast proto-
cols [2], [9]–[12], or asynchronous (non real-time) Byzantine
ones [13]–[17]. On the one hand, real-time reliable broadcast
protocols cannot tolerate attacks: such algorithms would fail,
even if a single process is compromised. Using naive plat-
form restarts or cryptography alone is insufficient, and hence
does not solve the problem [18], [19]. On the other hand,
existing asynchronous Byzantine solutions do not support real-
time. Yet, critical CPS applications must have information
disseminated correctly, reliably and in real-time, e.g., as in
power system control applications that need to open and close
multiple distributed circuit breakers based on thresholds and
sensor data [20].
We approach the aforementioned threats first by formally
specifying the needed broadcast properties via an abstrac-
tion, which we call Real-Time Byzantine Reliable Broadcast
(RTBRB). We then prove that in systems where processes
can be Byzantine and communication can simultaneously fail,
it is impossible to implement the RTBRB abstraction using
traditional distributed computing assumptions and techniques,
e.g., where the error/failure detection mechanisms of processes
are oblivious of the broadcast algorithm. We also prove
that this holds even with the help of sophisticated failure
detectors that perfectly reveal the identities of all faulty and
untimely processes.
We propose an algorithm, which we call RT-ByzCast, which
can cope with intermediate timing violations and uncertainties
while still providing a reliable end result in real-time. We
specifically prove that our algorithm indeed implements all
properties of the RTBRB abstraction. The main idea under-
lying our RT-ByzCast algorithm is the use of a temporal
and spatial diffusion mechanism of signed messages over a
sliding time-window. This diffusion mechanism is augmented
with a scheme to aggregate signatures corresponding to those
messages. Hence, the time-window constitutes a slack. During
that slack, the aggregation and diffusion mechanism tries to
mask unanticipated violations, e.g., those caused by com-
munication losses, by having processes repeatedly aggregate
signatures relative to the same message and disseminate that
message again (temporal diffusion) and to other processes
(spatial diffusion).
In order to ensure safety, when losses cannot be masked
in time using our aggregation and diffusion scheme, our
algorithm triggers processes suffering such losses to crash
themselves. Doing so, RT-ByzCast bounds the amount of time
a correct process can lose communication with a quorum of
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2the network. This self-crashing capability allows our algorithm
to circumvent our impossibility result affecting traditional
distributed assumptions and techniques: we use process self-
crashing to make sure that the view of correct processes
is consistent between the error/failure detection mechanisms
and our broadcast algorithm. RT-ByzCast can affect which
processes are correct and which are not can revive processes
that have self-crashed themselves.
Our RT-ByzCast algorithm relies on quorums. The reader
might wonder that our principle, albeit safe, may lead the
system to a complete shutdown, by having “too many” pro-
cesses crash themselves. To this end, we perform a thorough
simulation of the probability of a process crashing itself in
our RT-ByzCast algorithm. We demonstrate that even for high
loss rates (60% loss rate), the probability that a process crashes
itself in RT-ByzCast is negligible for systems with more than 5
processes. We show as well that as the system size increases,
the probability of a process crashing itself becomes asymptotic
to 0 for any loss rate; hence the system liveness is almost
always guaranteed. This matches the typical applications of
the target CPS systems we envisage, e.g., the smart grid, where
computing sensing and communication devices are deployed in
large scale. Moreover, we devise a method that allows systems
using our algorithm to tolerate any number of correct processes
crashing themselves without shutting down. Our method is
based on a scheme for detecting correct processes that crash
themselves and over provisioning the number of processes
(replicas) used.
Another concern of the reader might arise regarding the
expected performance of our algorithm. We show that RT-
ByzCast can meet the timing constraints of a large class of
typical CPS applications, mainly in SCADA and IoT areas:
power system automation and substation automation appli-
cations (time constants ≤ 100 ms); slow speed auto-control
functions (≤ 500 ms); continuous control applications (≤ 1 s);
or (iii) operator commands of SCADA applications (≤ 2 s).
In summary, the main contributions of this paper are:
1) Theoretical proofs showing that when processes and
links can fail, it is impossible to implement RTBRB
under traditional distributed computing paradigms that
consider processes’ correctness checks as oblivious of
the broadcast algorithm. We prove that the impossibility
holds even when the identity of all faulty and unrespon-
sive processes is known.
2) RT-ByzCast, an algorithm that implements the RTBRB
abstraction by aggregating and diffusing digital signa-
tures in a sliding time-window to mask individual com-
munication losses. When messages cannot be masked in
time, RT-ByzCast forces processes experiencing those
losses to crash themselves.
3) A thorough simulation of the reliability and availability
of our RT-ByzCast algorithm under many communica-
tion loss rates and system sizes.
4) A performance evaluation showing RT-ByzCast’s latency
and network overhead.
5) Ways to adapt RT-ByzCast to handle churn.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
details the system model. Section III defines the real-time
Byzantine reliable broadcast (RTBRB) abstraction. Section IV
studies the feasibility of implementing RTBRB under tradi-
tional distributed computing assumptions. Section V presents
the intuitions and details of our RT-ByzCast algorithm. Sec-
tion VI demonstrates the reliability nad performance of our
RT-ByzCast algorithm by (i) evaluating the probability of a
process crashing itself, (ii) computing the probability that the
system shuts down, (iii) showing how to allow a system to
tolerate the crash of correct processes without causing system
shutdown, and (iv) showing the broadcast delivery latency un-
der different system sizes and message loss rates. Section VII
discusses how to revive self-crashed processes. Section VIII
illustrates and details how our RT-ByzCast algorithm can be
adapted to handle dynamic systems. Section IX discusses RT-
ByzCast application domains and systems. Finally Section X
and Section XI discuss existing related work and conclude the
paper respectively. For presentation purposes, we defer proofs
and additional evaluations to a companion dedicated appendix.
II. SYSTEM AND THREAT MODEL
A. System Model
a) Processes: We consider a distributed system con-
sisting of a set of n > 1 processes, denoted by Π =
{p1, p2, ..., pn}. Processes are synchronous, i.e., the delay for
performing a local step has a fixed known bound, assumed to
be negligible compared to communication delays.
Processes have access to local clocks. For presentation
simplicity, we assume that these clocks are synchronized, with
a bounded skew. Using these clocks, processes define syn-
chronous rounds of the same fixed duration (time-triggered).
Rounds are synchronized among all processes, i.e., the start
and end of a round occur at all hosts at the same time (with a
bounded skew). For a particular round, clocks can trigger an
initialization signal at all processes, upon which processes are
awakened and initialized as part of the system.
b) Communication: Every pair of processes is connected
by two logical uni-directional links. Precisely, processes pi
and pj are connected by links lij and lji. Links can abstract
a physical bus or a dedicated network link/path.
We assume that links are reliable and within the maximum
delay with high probability. This means that in any transmis-
sion attempt, where a message is sent over a link, there is a
high probability that the message reaches its destination within
a maximum delay d after being transmitted. However, there is
a small probability that reliability and timeliness are violated.
Such violations exist in networks, as arguably all communica-
tion is prone to random disturbances, e.g., bad channel quality,
interference, collisions, and buffer overflows [4].
We consider both message losses and delays as omissions.
That is, late messages (violating the d delay assumption) are
simply dropped (ignored). This way we treat timing faults [21]
as omissions. We define the duration of any synchronous round
to be d, the upper bound on a reliable and timely transmission.
As such, any message sent at the beginning of round r, if not
omitted, is assumed to be received by the end of round r.
We consider that processes always send their messages at the
beginning of a round. In our model, it is sufficient that delay
d is only known by the local clocks that define rounds and
not processes. Processes in some round r consider late any
received message with a round number < r.
3B. Threat Model
a) Clocks: We assume that the local synchronized clocks
of non-Byzantine nodes are secure and hence cannot be
attacked. Previous work showed that such secure and synchro-
nized clocks can be built in similar environments using trusted
components [22] or GPS [23].
b) Processes: We assume that some processes can ex-
hibit arbitrary, a.k.a. Byzantine, behavior. Byzantine nodes can
abstract processes that have been compromised by attackers,
or are executing the algorithm incorrectly, e.g., as a result of
some fault (software or hardware). A Byzantine process can
behave arbitrarily, e.g., it may crash, fail to send or receive
messages, delay messages, send arbitrary messages, etc.
We recall that in every transmission attempt a link may
(with some probability) violate reliability and timeliness by
dropping the message or delivering it within a delay > d. In
both cases (dropped and delayed), that message is omitted;
hence a sender needs to re-transmit that message again and
face yet another risk of transmission failure. Due to omissions
(losses and delays in consecutive transmission attempts) and
the required follow-up re-transmissions, the time it takes to
send a message reliably from one process to another (mea-
sured from the time of the first transmission attempt) may
be unbounded. So, despite links being reliable and timely
with high probability, our communication system is no longer
synchronous. Our system (not being synchronous) can tolerate
at maximum f = bn−13 c Byzantine processes. Such an f is
proved to be the maximum number of Byzantine processes
that an asynchronous system with n processes can tolerate to
implement any form of agreement [17], [24]. f is known to
the processes.
A process that exhibits a Byzantine behavior is termed
faulty. Otherwise the process does not deviate from the spec-
ification of the algorithm and is said to be non-Byzantine.
If the algorithm specifies some non-Byzantine processes to
crash themselves within the algorithm’s execution, then such
crashed processes are termed faulty as well (excluded by the
algorithm). The rest of the processes (the non-faulty ones) are
termed as correct. More formally, consider an algorithm A
that begins execution at some global time t for a period ∆T .
Definition 1. All non-Byzantine processes that do not crash
themselves, in [t, t + ∆T ] are correct wr.t. A. All other pro-
cesses (Byzantine and non-Byzantine that crashed themselves)
are faulty.
c) Communication: Links are assumed to be faithful and
authenticated, i.e., a link does not alter the content of mes-
sages. Hence, Byzantine processes cannot modify messages
sent on a link connecting correct processes. Recall however,
that links can, with a small probability, violate reliability and
timeliness. A message transmitted on link lij , ∀i 6= j, at any
time t has probability 0 < 1 < P oij(t) < 2 << 1 of getting
lost or delayed.
In practice, losses and delays can be correlated and may
usually come in bursts, i.e., periods where messages are
consecutively lost/delayed. Burst lengths can be well antici-
pated (with high coverage)1. Accordingly, we denote by k the
1For example in control systems it is very unlikely that a network link
has more than two consecutive message losses. We refer readers to studies
like [10], [25] that elaborate on how to estimate link burstiness.
maximum burst lengths (in rounds) that are expected to be
observed in our network (a.k.a. omission degree). Note that
this does not mean the bursts of length > k rounds will not
occur, it rather indicates that they seldom do and the system
should still account for them. Namely, a link lij , ∀i 6= j,
at any time t has probability P kij(t) of experiencing bursts
of length k. P kij(t) is essentially a function of P
o
ij(t), i.e.,
P kij(t) = F(P oij(t)).
III. REAL-TIME BYZANTINE RELIABLE BROADCAST
We now define the properties of the real-time Byzantine
reliable broadcast (RTBRB). Roughly speaking, RTBRB is
a communication primitive that allows information to be
disseminated reliably and timely in a one-to-all manner.
For simplicity, we provide the definition of RTBRB as
an abstraction that allows at most one message to be deliv-
ered/broadcast. This definition can be easily extended to allow
processes to broadcast multiple messages, e.g., see [15], [18]
that resolve this using message identifiers.
1) RTBRB-Validity: If a correct process broadcasts m, then
some correct process eventually delivers m.
2) RTBRB-No duplication: Every correct process delivers
at most once a message.
3) RTBRB-Integrity: If some correct process delivers a
message m with sender pi and process pi is correct,
then m was previously broadcast by pi.
4) RTBRB-Agreement: If some message m is delivered by
any correct process, then every correct process eventu-
ally delivers m.
5) RTBRB-Timeliness: There exists a known ∆ such that if
a correct process broadcasts m at real-time t, no correct
process delivers m after real time t+ ∆.
RTBRB provides processes with two operations, namely
RTBRB-broadcast() and RTBRB-deliver(). A process broad-
casts a message by invoking RTBRB-broadcast(). Similarly, a
process delivers a message by invoking RTBRB-deliver().
We next compare RTBRB properties to those of existing
broadcast abstractions highlighting the differences.
RTBRB Versus Existing Broadcast Primitives
a) Byzantine Reliable Broadcast: An asynchronous
Byzantine reliable broadcast [13], [14] guarantees only a
subset of the properties of RTBRB (all except RTBRB-
Timeliness). In this sense, as opposed to asynchronous Byzan-
tine reliable broadcast which delivers messages only eventually
(i.e., with no predictability measures) our RTBRB primitive
provides a timeliness bound: a message sent by correct
processes is delivered within a known fixed duration after
being broadcast.
b) Real-Time Reliable Broadcast: Synchronous (or real-
time) reliable broadcasts [10], [26] provide known fixed
bounds on delivering broadcast messages. However they only
handle fail-silent process failures and hence cannot tolerate
maliciousness.
c) Atomic Broadcast: Unlike liveness in the context
of (asynchronous) reliable broadcast, the RTBRB-Timeliness
property (a safety property) introduces a scent of (physical)
ordering, since it stipulates, for each execution, a termination
event to occur “at or before” some ∆ on the time-line.
This said, one may wonder to what extent does this go into
4reaching a linear ordering, and thus in the direction of atomic
broadcast. In RTBRB, the interleaving of broadcasts from
multiple senders, namely when multiple broadcasts are issued
in a period shorter than ∆ − d, might result in messages
delivered to different processes in a different order. RTBRB-
Timeliness ensures that a message m is delivered at some time
in [d,∆] after the broadcast.
IV. FEASIBILITY OF IMPLEMENTING RTBRB
We now study the feasibility of implementing RTBRB using
traditional distributed assumptions and techniques.
A. RTBRB Using Failure Detectors
Traditionally, algorithms are designed to guarantee proper-
ties without affecting the correctness of processes. However,
algorithms may rely on components, e.g., failure detectors
(FDs) [27], which are external software blocks that provide
hints about which processes are faulty. Failure detectors encap-
sulate synchrony assumptions. Thus, when added to systems
with timing uncertainties (i.e., asynchronous), failure detectors
make it possible to devise modular algorithms that solve,
despite network uncertainties, difficult distributed computing
problems, e.g., consensus [28].
In this section, we prove impossibility results showing that
RTBRB cannot be implemented using traditional modular
schemes relying on external software blocks, even when these
blocks are the “most powerful” ones, such as perfect crash
failure detectors, e.g., [27]. These impossibilities indicate that
monitoring untimely processes in systems supported by real-
time broadcast networks with timing uncertainties (timing and
omission faults), should be done within the algorithm imple-
menting RTBRB rather than externally. In short this means
going against the modular failure detectors trend initiated
with [27] and being more in line with the model of [26], hence
featuring failure detectors and membership integrated with the
broadcast protocol.
We give the intuition of why this is surprisingly so, and
present proofs of the results. In this sense, we help establish,
in this section, a clear understanding of the design constraints
that should be followed/avoided when devising algorithms for
distributed real-time systems exhibiting timing uncertainties,
before delving into the system design. We first define a few
essential terms.
Definition 2. A component is oblivious of an algorithm A if
that component does not adapt its behavior to the decisions
and actions of A. Such a component does not take any input
from A and hence any changes to A result in no impact on
the behavior of that component. Moreover, messages relative
to that component are assumed to be independent of A’s
messages (i.e., messages are sent separately over the network).
Definition 3. A Perfect Crash Failure Detector (P) [27]
guarantees:
1) Strong completeness: Eventually every faulty process is
permanently suspected by all correct processes.
2) Strong accuracy: A correct process is never suspected.
Assumption 1. Detector P is oblivious of algorithm A that
implements RTBRB.
Assumption 2. Algorithm A uses P .
Assumption 3. Algorithm A does not use any additional
hardware or software components besides P and the network.
Theorem 1. No algorithm A can implement the RTBRB
abstraction under Assumptions 1, 2 and 3.
The proof relies on the fact that even when knowing the
identity of all correct processes, some correct processes might
not be reachable in real-time (any predefined duration) through
the network (due to probabilistic message losses). Traditional
failure detectors [27] seek eventual reachability, while we seek
real-time reachability. In other words, such an impossibility
does not exist in time-free systems (a.k.a. asynchronous) but
merely in those systems requiring a timeliness property. The
reason follows from the fact that in time-free asynchronous
systems, all correct processes are eventually reachable, even
with our notion of links. Reachability changes from being a
liveness property (eventual reachability) in time-free systems
to being a safety property (timed reachability) in a real-
time context. The detailed proof of Theorem 1 is subsumed
by the proof of the more general result of Theorem 2.
We investigate next the feasibility of implementing RTBRB
when failure detectors can detect, not only crashed processes,
but also those processes that are not reachable in time.
Perhaps surprisingly, we prove below that the impossibility
still persists, if the failure detector remains oblivious of the
algorithm implementing RTBRB.
B. RTBRB Using Proactive Reachability Failure Detectors
In order to determine which processes are alive and reach-
able in real-time distributed systems, a widely common prac-
tice is to use failure detectors that rely on heartbeats with a
concrete timeliness specification [25], [29]–[32].
Definition 4. Consider some fixed interval of l rounds denoted
by ∆l. Process pi is said to be timely reachable at round r′, if
for all other correct processes pj in the system, pj has received
some message from pi within the past ∆l interval from r′.
Conversely, a process pi is unreachable, if pi is not timely
reachable at some round by at least one other correct process.
Definition 5. A Proactive Reachability Failure Detector (PR)
guarantees the following properties:
1) Strong timed completeness: Every unreachable process
is permanently suspected by all correct processes, at
most ∆m rounds after becoming unreachable.
2) Strong timed accuracy: No correct process that is timely
reachable is suspected before crashing or becoming
unreachable.
Note that the notion of reachability subsumes the notion of
crashed (faulty). It is also important to observe that the notion
of reachability in Definition 4 is the one that restricts the set of
correct and reachable processes the most: the set of processes
termed as unreachable is largest under Definition 4. In this
sense, impossibilities proven with PR using our definition of
reachability are the strongest.
An example of a PR implementation in our system is one
that: (1) relies on timeouts (e.g., expiring every ∆l rounds) and
periodic message (heartbeat) exchange between processes, (2)
defines timeouts on process pi as a multiple of the period at
which pi sends heartbeats, and (3) “suspects” a process pi only
when some correct process cannot receive, within the specified
timeouts, (direct or indirect) heartbeats sent by pi.
5Assumption 4. Detector PR is oblivious of algorithm A that
implements RTBRB.
Assumption 5. Algorithm A uses PR.
Assumption 6. Algorithm A does not use any additional soft-
ware or hardware components besides PR and the network.
Theorem 2. No algorithm A can implement the RTBRB
abstraction under Assumptions 4, 5 and 6.
Roughly speaking, the proof hinges on two main ideas:
1) The reachability uncovered by PR has a different time-
window than that of A. Namely, suspected processes
(by PR) are processes that are not reachable up to
the current moment, while A would need to see the
reachability from the current moment onward.
2) In the same network, due to probabilistic violations of
reliability and timeliness, different oblivious applications
(which send messages independently of each other) can
reach different processes given specific time-constraints.
Hence, processes considered to be reachable from PR’s
perspective might not be reachable in time by the
broadcast algorithm.
The detailed proof of Theorem 2 can be found in Appendix A.
Corollary 1. Detecting unreachable processes using a failure
detector is not sufficient to allow the implementation of the
RTBRB abstraction if that failure detector is oblivious of the
algorithm implementing RTBRB.
In short, in order to implement RTBRB in a probabilistically
synchronous network, we need to (1) integrate the proactive
reachability failure detector within the protocol implement-
ing RTBRB and (2) allow this compound to decide which
processes are reachable within the hard timing constraints. In
other words, in order to implement RTBRB, the reachability
from the perspective of the algorithm implementing RTBRB
should be reconciled with that of PR. We accordingly pro-
pose in what follows a solution that implements RTBRB by
embedding the PR functionality in the RTBRB protocol.
V. AN ALGORITHM IMPLEMENTING RTBRB
In this section, we propose an algorithm, which we call RT-
ByzCast that implements the RTBRB abstraction by avoiding
the traditional design pitfalls highlighted in Section IV. RT-
ByzCast relies on three main things: processes monitoring each
other, message diffusion and signature aggregation over a time-
window, and processes capable of crashing themselves. We
present the intuition behind each.
a) Process monitoring: Processes do not know before-
hand when a broadcast might be invoked. In our system,
omissions on any link may be of unbounded durations (even
if with a small probability). Thus, there might exist a correct
process p that stays unaware of a broadcast invoked by process
q: p may lose for an unbounded amount of time messages
relative q’s broadcast.
In order to provide any form of real-time guarantee, it is
crucial to detect the occurrence of such timing violations and
react to them. We develop the proof-of-life function (Func-
tion 1), which requires processes to periodically exchange
heartbeats (and echo received ones) when they do not know of
any broadcast. A process p that does not hear enough echoes
pi
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Figure 1. (a) pi gathers 2f + 1 signatures in R rounds; (b) pi does not
gather 2f + 1 signatures in R rounds and crashes itself.
of its own heartbeats can thus suspect that it either has lost
communication with many other processes or that it does not
know about an invoked broadcast.
b) Message diffusion and signature aggregation: In our
system, messages can be omitted, hence re-transmissions are
needed to guarantee successful delivery. A digital signature
of process p on some message m constitutes an unforgeable
proof that p processed m, is aware of it, and has sent (relayed)
m. Our algorithm requires processes to aggregate, over some
pre-defined time-window, the different observed signatures on
a received broadcast message (including their own signature).
This way a process receiving a message m can know (from
m’s aggregated signature) the identity of processes that have
received m (within the pre-defined time-window). Besides
aggregation our algorithm requires processes to diffuse a
received message m (along with its aggregated signature)
by re-transmitting m within the pre-defined time-window
multiple times and to other processes. This diffusion helps
mask network omissions by exploiting multiple network paths,
e.g., relaying information via intermediate processes.
In fact, our time-window creates a slack period of “collec-
tive re-transmissions” in which, even if a message is omitted a
few times, it still has a high chance (as shown in Section VI)
of being successfully received by the end of that time-window
(which can be viewed now as the new deadline). We denote by
R the duration of that time-window (in rounds). R is a param-
eter of our algorithm (known to processes) and represents the
delay we tolerate for a round-trip message delay. The larger
the value of R, the bigger the slack period, but the higher
the chances of a message being received in that duration (see
Section VI). In this sense, R = f(k), meaning that R is a
function of k (the anticipated omission degree), R ≥ 2k + 2
to account for a round-trip bound.
c) Self-crash capabilities: A message sent by a non-
Byzantine process p might still fail to reach “enough” pro-
cesses, despite diffusion and aggregation within a time-
window of duration R (assumptions on omission degree,
despite their high coverage, might be violated). In that case,
our algorithm triggers p to crash itself (we formally define
when a process crashes itself in Definition 7). A non-Byzantine
process p that “crashes itself” is no longer correct with respect
to the algorithm’s correctness properties.
6Function 1 proof-of-life(∆r)@ process pj
1: for every round r do
2: Send HB({pj , r}; Φpj) to all p ∈ Π
3: end for
4: upon event <receive HB({pi, r}; sigs) at some round r′ > do
5: // sigs designates the signatures on {pi, r}.
6: Verify message validity
7: Set sigs = sigs
⋃
Φpj
8: for every round in [r′ + 1, r + ∆r] do
9: Send HB({pi, r}; sigs) to all p ∈ Π
10: end for
11:
12: for every round r where r > timew do
13: Compute RHB(pj , r)
14: // RHB(pj , r):set of processes that received some heartbeat from pj
(directly or indirectly), during some round in [r − 1−∆r, r − 1]
15: if |RHB(pj , r)| ≤ 2f then
16: Transition to Dead-State
17: end if
18: end for
A. RT-ByzCast Overview
We present now a high-level view of how our algorithm
works in systems where n = 3f + 1 processes.
1) Behavior of Processes Unaware of a Broadcast
Every process that did not receive any message relative to
a broadcast, executes the proof-of-life function (Function 1),
where a process periodically sends a signed heartbeat message
to all other processes. When process pj receives pi’s heartbeat
at round r, pj : (i) aggregates signatures relative to pi’s
heartbeats (signatures of heartbeats sent by pi in [r, r − R]),
(ii) appends its own signature to the formed aggregate, and
(iii) periodically echoes pi’s heartbeat, with the aggregated
signatures, to all other processes (see Figure 1). A process
p executing the proof-of-life crashes itself when p does not
receive in any time-window of duration R, 2f + 1 signatures
on its own heartbeats (including its own signature).
2) Behavior of Processes Knowledgeable of a Broadcast
In this case, a process echoes periodically the broadcasted
value, only if that value is indeed sent by the process that
originally issued the broadcast. If multiple values are heard
relative to a single process, the first heard value is the one
to be echoed. Processes continue to execute the proof-of-life
function, however, piggybacking proof-of-life messages to the
echo messages of the broadcast.
Similar to the proof-of-life function, processes aggregate
and append signatures relative to a given broadcast value in a
window of R rounds (from the current round). Upon receiving
a value that is signed by more than 2f processes, a process
delivers that value. A process that does not receive more than
2f signatures in a R time-window after being aware of the
broadcast crashes itself (see Definition 7).
3) RT-ByzCast Latency
Our RT-ByzCast algorithm delivers messages within an
upper bound of 3R rounds. The following example briefly
highlights the intuition behind requiring 3R (the detailed
proof can be found in Appendix B. Assume a correct process
issues a broadcast at round r. By round r + R, at least 2f
other processes would have seen that broadcast (otherwise
the broadcasting process kills itself). In the worst case, those
processes would see the broadcast at round r+R−1. Assume
that the remaining f processes in the system have not yet
received the broadcast message. By round r + 2R these f
processes should have heard about the broadcast or otherwise
Function 2 aggregate-sigpj (v, pi,Φpx , ...,Φpz , pk)
1: if (v, ...) /∈ Msg[pi][pk] then
2: Set sigs = Φpj
⋃
Φpx , ...,Φpz , after verifying that px, ..., pz
indeed signed v.
3: Add (v, sigs) to Msg[pi][pk],
4: end if
5: if (v, ...) ∈ Msg[pi][pk] then
6: Consider that sigs = ..., then update (v, sigs) in Msg[pi][pk] such
that (v, sigs) includes as well the signatures relative to px, ..., pz , i.e.,
sigs = sigs
⋃
Φpx , ...,Φpz .
7: end if
8: return sigs;
Function 3 deliver-messagepj (pi, v, sigs) @ round r
1: Deliver v (if not already delivered)
2: Initialize Rdeliver(pi, r) = pj
3: Stop sending any Echo()
4: Send Deliverpj((pi, v, sigs); Φpj) at the beginning of every round
in [r + 1, r + 1 + 2R], where sigs contains signatures of all processes
in Recho(pi, r0, v).
// Φpj is pj ’s signature on the new payload: (pi, v, sigs)
5: At the beginning of round r + 2 + 2R:
6: if (no Echo() or RTBRB-broadcast() is being sent) then
7: Execute proof-of-life(R) (non-piggyback mode).
8: end if
they would kill themselves (processes that already received the
broadcast send heartbeats only via echo messages relative to
the broadcast). After receiving the broadcast, these f processes
have an additional R rounds to collect enough signatures and
hence will deliver the broadcast message at worst by r+ 3R.
B. Description of RT-ByzCast
We now describe our algorithm formally and in more
details. Using our RT-ByzCast algorithm, non-Byzantine
processes can be in one of two states: the Alive-State or the
Dead-State. Non-Byzantine processes in the Alive-State follow
the algorithm faithfully. Processes in the Dead-State, however,
refrain from sending any messages and do not respond to
any higher-level application requests. A process in the Dead-
State appears to have crashed as in fail-stop failures [16]. For
presentation simplicity, we consider that once a process is
in the Dead-State, it remains in the Dead-State forever. In
Section VII, we discuss how processes can be revived, by
returning to the Alive-State and participating in the algorithm.
Initially, after receiving an initiation signal from the clock,
all processes are awakened and execute in the Alive-State.
Every process pi defines a time-window of a known fixed
size of R > 1 rounds and Msg[]n[]n, an initially empty array
to store the values broadcast relative to each process, with
the corresponding signatures on these values. Msg[]n[]n is
the local data structure that stores relative to each process
that issues a broadcast and each process that echoes it, the
broadcast values and their aggregated signatures. For example,
Msg[pi][pk] stores all messages with aggregated signatures that
are broadcast by some process pi and that are echoed by a
process pk. After initialization, every process in the Alive-State
executes a proof-of-life function with parameter ∆r = R.
A process pi that executes the proof-of-life function sends
a heartbeat HB({pi, r}; Φpi) to all processes at the beginning
of every round r, where Φpi denotes pi’s signature over
the heartbeat. A process pj receiving HB({pi, r}; sigs) at
some round r′ verifies that the heartbeat has been indeed
seen by the processes that signed it (sigs is the set of
7signatures on {pi, r}). Then pj appends its signature to sigs
and sends HB({pi, r}; sigs) to all other processes in all
rounds ∈ [r′+1, r+∆r] (lines 7-10). A process pi computes at
the beginning of every round r : r > ∆r the set RHB(pi, r),
which is the set of distinct processes that were able to receive
some heartbeat from pi (directly or indirectly), during some
round in [r − 1−∆r, r − 1].
Precisely, let us denote by M the set of HB({pi, r′′}; ∗)
heartbeats that pi received. Then RHB(pi, r) contains all
processes that have their signature in any heartbeat in M such
that round r′′ ∈ [r − 1 − ∆r, r − 1]. For any round after
∆r rounds elapse since system initialization (i.e., ∀ rounds
r : r > ∆r), if ever |RHB(pi, r)| ≤ 2f , then process pi
transitions to the Dead-State (lines 12-18).
RT-ByzCast: The Algorithm (Algorithm 4)
After system start-up, every process pi begins by executing
the proof-of-life function with ∆r = R. A process pi that
wishes to broadcast a value v at round r−1 initializes an empty
set denoted by Recho(pi, r, v). Then pi signs (pi, r−1, v) with
an unforgeable signature Φpi and produces the tuple {(pi, r−
1, v); Φpi}. This tuple is made of two parts: a payload and a
signed-by part. For example, the tuple {(pi, r−1, v); Φpi} has
(pi, r− 1, v) as payload and Φpi as the signed-by. Afterwards
process pi sends at the beginning of round r− 1, the message
RTBRB-broadcast((pi, r − 1, v); Φpi) to all processes.
When a process pj (that is executing the proof-of-life func-
tion) first receives an RTBRB-broadcast((pi, r′, v); Φpi)
message in round r ≥ r′ from pi, process pj initializes an
empty set denoted by Rpjecho(pi, r + 1, v; Φpi). Afterwards pj
retrieves the tuple {(pi, r′, v); Φpi}, verifies that pi indeed sent
v, and produces the tuple {(pi, r′, v; Φpi); Φpj} by appending
pj’s signature to the signed-by field.
Process pj starts sending at the beginning of every round
(as of round r onward) Echopj((pi, r
′, v; Φpi); Φpj) to all
other processes. Process pj continues to execute the proof-
of-life function however by piggybacking its heartbeats on
Echopj((pi, r
′, v; Φpi); Φpj).
When process pj receives a (valid)
Echopk((pi, r
′, v; Φpi); Φpx , ...,Φpz) at some round r ,
pj behaves as follows.
A. If pj is not sending any Echo()(lines 14-27): then
if pj has not already delivered a message from pi, pj ag-
gregates signatures in the variable sigs. It does so using
the function aggregate-sigpj (...) (detailed Function 2) that
combines all observed signatures on messages sent by pk
containing (pi, r′, v). Then if signatures in sigs do not add up
to 2f+1 processes, pj sends Echopj((pi, r+1, v; Φpi); Φpj)
and initializes a set (Recho(pi, r+1, v)) that tracks the number
of signatures collected on the Echopj((pi, r+1, v; Φpi); ...).
Otherwise, i.e., if signatures in sigs amount to at least 2f + 1
processes, pj sets Recho(pi, r, v) = sigs and delivers the
message by executing deliver-message(v, sigs). Any process
pj that executes deliver-message(pi, v, sigs) delivers message
(pi, v, sigs) and only sends Deliverpj((pi, v, sigs); ...) for
2R rounds. pj should collect a least 2f + 1 signatures during
the first R rounds. This requirement ensures that there is a full
R-duration during which at least f + 1 correct processes are
sending only such deliver messages2.
If no Echo() or RTBRB-broadcast() is being
sent/received, pj executes the proof-of-life function with pa-
rameter R (without piggybacking).
Algorithm 4 RT-ByzCast
1: Init: Msg[]n[]n = ∅
2: Execute proof-of-life(R);
3: upon event <pi wants to broadcast a value v> do
4: Execute proof-of-life function in piggyback mode
5: Initialize Recho(pi, r, v) = ∅
6: Send periodically starting from the current round
RTBRB-broadcast((pi, rcurrent, v); Φpi) to all p ∈ Π
7:
8: upon event <receive RTBRB-broadcast((pi, r′, v); Φpi)in round
r − 1 ≥ r′ for the first time> do
9: Execute proof-of-life function in piggyback mode
10: Initialize Rpjecho(pi, r, v) = pi; sigs = Φpj
11: Send Echopj((pi, r′, v; Φpi ); sigs) to all p ∈ Π at rounds≥ r
12:
@ process pj :
13: upon event <receive Echopk((pi, r
′, v; Φpi ); Φpx , ...,Φpz) at
round r do
14: if pj is not sending any Echo() then
15: Set sigs = aggregate-sigpj (v, pi,Φpx ...Φpz , pk)
16: if pj has not already delivered a message relative to pi then
17: Execute proof-of-life function in piggyback mode.
18: Initialize Recho(pi, r + 1, v) = ∅
19: if sigs ≤ 2f then
20: Send at the beginning of every cycle (as of round r + 1
onward) Echopj((pi, r + 1, v; Φpi ); Φpj) if k 6= j
21: end if
22: end if
23: if sigs > 2f (for the first time) then
24: Set Recho(pi, r, v) = sigs
25: Execute deliver-message(pi, v, sigs)
26: end if
27: end if
28: if pj is sending an Echopj((pi, r′, v; Φpi ); ...) then
29: Set sigs = aggregate-sigpj (v, pi,Φpx ...Φpz , pk)
30: if sigs > 2f (for the first time) then
31: Set Recho(pi, r, v) = sigs
32: Execute deliver-message(pi, v, sigs).
33: end if
34: if sigs ≤ 2f ∧ k = j then
35: Set Recho(pi, r, v) = sigs.
36: end if
37: if sigs ≤ 2f then
38: Send at the beginning of every cycle (as of round r + 1
onward) Echopk((pi, r
′, v; Φpi ); sigs) to all p ∈ Π
39: end if
40: end if
41: if pj is sending Echopj((pi, r′′, v′; Φpi ); ∗) : v′ 6= v then
42: Set sigs = aggregate-sigpj (v′, pi,Φpx ...Φpz , pk)
43: if sigs > 2f (for the first time) then
44: Set Recho(pi, r, v) = sigs
45: Execute deliver-message(pi, v′, sigs)
46: end if
47: end if
48:
49: upon event <receive Deliverpk((pi, v, sigs); Φpx ...Φpz) at
round r> do
50: if ((pi, v) is not delivered yet then
51: Deliver v
52: Stop sending any Echo()
53: Initialize set Rdeliver(pi, r) = {px, ..., pz}
54: else
55: Rdeliver(pi, r′) = Rdeliver(pi, r′)
⋃{px, ..., pz}.
56: end if
57: Send Deliverpj((pi, v, sigs); signatures) to all p ∈ Π at
every round in [r+1, r+1+2R], signatures contains the signatures
of all processes in Rdeliver(pi, ...).
58: Execute same commands as lines 5-8 of deliver-messagepj (...)
59:
2This requirement ensures agreement on delivering the same message
among all correct processes, when broadcasting nodes are malicious.
8B. If pj is sending an Echopj((pi, r′, v; Φpi); ...) (lines 30-
42): In this case, if pj has not delivered a message from pi, pj
aggregates signatures in sigs (using the function aggregate-
sigpj (...)). Then pj checks if sigs contains more than 2f
signatures, in which case pj sets Recho(pi, r, v) = sigs and
delivers (pi, r′, v) by executing deliver-message(pi, v, sigs).
Otherwise, i.e., if |sigs| ≤ 2f , pj sends echoes of (pi, r′, v)
with the new aggregated signatures, if (k = j).
C. If pj is sending an Echopj((pi, r′′, v′; Φpi); ∗) where
v′ 6= v: pj aggregates signatures in sigs (using the func-
tion aggregate-sigpj (v
′, pi,Φpx ...Φpz ,Φpk )). Then pj checks
if sigs contains more than 2f signatures, in which case pj
delivers (pi, r′′, v′) by executing deliver-message(pi, v′, sigs).
If pj receives Deliverpk((pi, v, sigs); Φpx ...Φpz) for the
first time at round r (lines 49-58), pj delivers (pi, v, sigs)
by executing deliver-message(pi, v, sigs). If pj has pre-
viously seen such a Deliver() message, pj aggre-
gates in the variable signatures all the signatures it has
on Deliverpj((pi, v, sigs); ...) messages. Then pj sends
Deliverpj((pi, v, sigs); signatures) at the beginning of
every round ∈ [r + 1, r + 1 + 2R].
At the beginning of round r + 2 + 2R, if pj is not
sending any Echo() or RTBRB-broadcast(), then pj
executes the proof-of-life function with parameter R (without
piggybacking).
Definition 6. Any RTBRB-broadcast(pi, ...) or
Echo(pi, ...) message is termed invalid when it possesses
any incorrect signature. Any Deliver((pi, ..., sigs)...) is
termed invalid when it possesses any incorrect signature,
or when sigs has less than 2f + 1 correct signatures. If a
process receives invalid messages, it ignores them.
Remark 1. A process sending RTBRB-broadcast(),
Echo() or Deliverpj(), executes proof-of-life by pig-
gybacking heartbeats to the sent RTBRB-broadcast(),
Echopj() and Deliverpj(); otherwise heartbeats are sent
in individual messages. This is represented in lines (4), (9),
and (17) of Algorithm 4.
Definition 7. A process pj crashes itself and transitions to the
Dead-State at the end of round rcur if any of the four cases
below is satisfied.
Case 1. A process pj transitions to the Dead-State if both
conditions below hold.
1) ∃r′ : |Recho(pi, r′, v)| ≤ 2f, ∀v ∧ rcur ≥ r′ + R
2) If pj has not discovered a lie. A process pj is said to
“discover a lie”, if pj can verify that two different values
have been sent by the process issuing the broadcast.
Case 2. pj transitions to the Dead-State if both conditions
hold: ∃r′ : |Rdeliver(pi, r′)| ≤ 2f , and rcur ≥ r′ + R.
Case 3. Process pj transitions to the Dead-State if pj does
not hear from at least 2f + 1 processes in any R window.
Case 4. Process pj transitions to the Dead-State if pj in
some duration R does not see echoes of its messages from at
least 2f + 1 processes.
We give now a brief intuition behind each of the four
cases. In Case 1, the first condition ensures that processes,
which cannot communicate with a Byzantine quorum, crash
themselves. The second condition avoids the denial of service
attack that a Byzantine process can launch. For Case 2 and
Case 3, consider a setting where a correct process p aggregates
2f + 1 signatures, delivers a message and directly loses
communication with other processes. Now assume that other
processes detect that the broadcasting process is lying. These
other processes do not kill themselves (by Case 1). If p
stays alive this would violate agreement. Case 2 eliminates
this violation. Case 3 eliminates a violation in agreement when
the processes that detect a lie are fewer than f + 1 and get
disconnected temporarily from the other correct processes that
deliver some v. Case 4 makes sure that any process whose
messages are not seen by (at least) 2f + 1 processes in any
duration of value R crashes itself. This case 4 is used to
allow the detection of processes that crash themselves (see
Section VI-C).
We present in Appendix B the proof that RT-ByzCast
implements the RTBRB abstraction.
VI. EVALUATION
We now present an analytic performance study of RT-
ByzCast. We evaluate first the probability of having a correct
process in RT-ByzCast, enter the Dead-State, i.e., crash itself.
A. Probability of a Correct Process Shutdown
The probability of a correct process crashing itself is crucial,
as it may hinder the reliability of the whole system, namely the
system’s liveness. For instance, in systems where n = 3f + 1
(which are a subset of systems with f < n3 ), having a single
correct process crash itself can result in a cascade of self-
induced crashes leading the whole system to shutdown. This
cascade is caused by the fact that one correct process crashing
itself may prevent correct processes ever gathering the required
2f + 1 quorum, e.g., if in the worst case all f processes are
Byzantine in addition to the correct process that crashed itself.
In our simulation setting, we first assume that all mes-
sages can be lost/omitted independently and with the same
probability, i.e., we assume that P oij(t) = p ∀ t, i 6= j.
In Appendix C, we study the effect of having correlated
losses/omissions that may result in bursts and show that a
large enough slack window masks losses/omissions regardless
of correlations and preserves drawn conclusions under the
independent assumption. We describe the simulation setting
in which we perform our evaluation.
Let us denote by C, the minimum set of non-Byzantine
processes, i.e, |C| = n − f . We run our simula-
tions for |C| ∈ {5, 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 100, 200} pro-
cesses. For each value of |C|, we consider various
probability values with which a sent message can be
lost/omitted. Namely, we consider the probability of los-
ing/omitting a message sent at any point in time to be
p ∈ {10−6, 10−5, 10−4, 10−3, 10−2, 10−1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5,
0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9}. For a given value of |C| and p, we invoke a
broadcast at one of the processes and record, after R rounds of
communication, if any process does not receive |C| signatures
on the value being broadcast. We repeat such an instance
106 times. We report our results showing:
num. of instances in which some correct process crashes itself
106 ,
for R ∈ {5, 6, 10, 15} rounds respectively. We select these
values of R to show that a well chosen fixed value regardless
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Figure 2. The probability of a correct process crashing itself in a system after
10 communication rounds (R = 5).
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Figure 3. The probability of a correct process crashing itself in a system after
10 communication rounds (R = 6).
of system size and loss probability allows our RT-ByzCast
algorithm to be reliable.
Our results in Figure 2, Figure 3, Figure 4, and Figure 5
show that our RT-ByzCast algorithm achieves a higher relia-
bility, i.e., a smaller probability of having a correct process
crash itself, as the number of non-Byzantine processes, |C|,
increases. This aspect of our algorithm is fundamental to the
typical applications of the target CPS systems we envisage,
e.g., the smart grid, where computing sensing and communi-
cation devices are deployed on a large scale.
Moreover, from a different perspective, namely by fixing |C|
and varying the window size (R), we show in Appendix D that
increasing the number of communication rounds (i.e., the value
of R) increases the reliability of our RT-ByzCast algorithm
for any number of correct processes. In fact, with R = 10
the probability of a process crashing itself becomes negligible
even with up to 60% losses/omissions rate.
B. Tolerating A Correct Process Self-Crash
Despite the small probability of having a process crash
itself, we provide in this section a means to allow the
system using RT-ByzCast to tolerate processes self-crashing
while still being available. Let us respectively denote by
Prob(pshutdown) and Prob(sysshutdown) the probability that
a process kills itself and the probability that the whole system
shuts down. A system where n = 3f + 1 shuts down, in the
worst-case, as soon as a single process crashes itself. Hence,
an upper bound on the probability that the whole system shuts
down can be formally expressed by:
Prob(sysshutdown) = 1− (1− Prob(pshutdown))2f+1.
(1)
A system using our RT-ByzCast algorithm can be made
more reliable while tolerating the maximum number of Byzan-
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Figure 4. The probability of a correct process crashing itself in a system after
10 communication rounds (R = 10).
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Figure 5. The probability of a correct process crashing itself in a system after
15 communication rounds (R = 15).
tine processes. Precisely, we can allow the system to tolerate
a single correct process crashing itself, after which any addi-
tional correct processes that crashes itself would trigger the
whole system to shutdown. To do so, for any desired value of
f , the maximum number of tolerable Byzantine processes, we
choose the total number of processes to be n = 3f + 3. Note
that selecting n as such means that the Byzantine quorum now
becomes of size 2f + 2 rather than 2f + 1. Correct processes
can gather such a quorum even if one correct process crashes
itself and all f processes are Byzantine.
With this optimization, the probability that whole system
shuts down takes a new value, which is expressed by:
Prob(sysshutdown) = 1−
1∑
k=0
(
n− f
k
)
(Prob(pshutdown))
k(1− Prob(pshutdown))n−f−k.
(2)
From Figure 4, a correct process crashes itself with a
probability < 106 in systems using more than 5 correct
processes, R = 10 rounds, and experiencing network omission
rate of up to 60%. Accordingly, we perform a numerical
analysis of the probability that the whole system shuts down as
expressed in (1), and (2) and we show our results in Figure 6.
The graphs of Figure 6 highlight the increase in reliability
between the two system design choices showing that a system
implementing RT-ByzCast operates with a very high reliability
(negligible probability of system shutdown).
Enhancing the reliability of the system further, by allowing
it to tolerate more correct processes crashing themselves, is
possible. However, doing so requires the system to have a
mechanism of globally detecting aborted processes that crash
themselves. We further elaborate on that in what follows.
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Figure 6. The probability of the whole system shutting down, when R = 10,
w.r.t. different values of the probability of a correct process crashing itself
under 60% network loss rates (taken from Figure 4).
C. Tolerating Any Number of Processes Self-Crashing
In this section, we introduce a way that allows us to design,
using RT-ByzCast, systems that can tolerate any number of
correct processes crashing themselves. The solution is based
on two main things: (i) over-provisioning and (ii) self-crash
detection. To over-provision in system design, namely means
to include additional redundant process replicas. In other
words, to tolerate f Byzantine processes and rep simultaneous
process self-crashes in the system (∀f, rep) we choose the total
number of processes, n, to satisfy n = 3f + rep+ 1.
Processes then will execute our RT-ByzCast using Byzantine
quorums depending on the value of n, which can only mono-
tonically decrease (due to processes crashing themselves). De-
signing a system as such means that the system can tolerate up
to rep correct processes crashing themselves simultaneously
(for any value of rep).
However, in order to support system liveness for up to rep
correct processes crashing themselves, the system would need
to detect, within R rounds after having crashed, every process
that crashed itself. This detection allows other correct pro-
cesses to update n and the needed quorums, without resulting
in a cascade of self crashes leading to system shutdown. To
this end, we describe in what follows a mechanism to detect
crashed processes within R rounds after crashing.
Detecting a Correct Process in the Dead-State
We recall that when a process pi executes the proof-of-
life function as well as when that process issues a broadcast,
pi needs to issue a message that should be seen by 2f + 1
processes within a window of R rounds; otherwise pi would
crash itself (case 4 of Section V-B). In this sense, having any
set of 2f + 1 processes not hearing from pi in a window of
R rounds indicates that pi has crashed itself (or is Byzantine).
Note that a process pj can hear from pi either directly or via
other processes.
The algorithm for detecting process self-crashes (and
Byzantine processes mimicking a self-crash behavior) works
as follows. Every process now includes in its message the
round number during which it has sent the message. Every
process pi appends to every message it sends a list Lpi of size
n, relative to the n processes in the system. Lpi contains, for
every process pj ∈ Π , the time-stamp relative to last time that
pj sent a message (based on pj’s messages that pi received).
Note that a stored time-stamp relative to process pj should
have an associated proof of validity, that being the signature of
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Figure 7. The size of the time window (R) depending on the system size and
the message loss probability.
pj on a message holding that time-stamp (invalid time-stamps
are ignored). Every process merges all the L lists received such
that the time-stamp with largest valid value for each process is
kept. In every round r : r > R, if a process pi receives 2f +1
lists such that the time-stamp relative to some process pj is
less than the current round minus R in all received L, then pi
does the following: (1) claims pj as crashed, (2) updates n to
n − 1 and updates as well the new corresponding Byzantine
quorum size, and (3) ignores all messages relative to pj that
may arrive at a later time.
D. Performance of RT-ByzCast
In addition to evaluating the reliability of RT-ByzCast, we
evaluate how fast it can deliver messages. In Appendix E,
we also show the incurred cost that RT-ByzCast has on the
network bandwidth. RT-ByzCast has a latency of at most 3R
to deliver a message to all correct processes. Recall that we
define R as a slack period of collective re-transmissions of
some message m sent by process p. The value of R should
be chosen such that p can know with high probability that at
least 2f + 1 processes received m.
We now simulate the value of R (in communication rounds)
as follows. We initially set R = 1 round and run our reliability
experiments for 2 × 105 times. We gradually increase the
value of R until no node aborts in all 2× 105 repetitions. In
our experiments, we assumed the worst case situation where
all “f” nodes are Byzantine and can obstruct our algorithm
by not forwarding messages’ signatures. Figure 7 represents
the value of R for 10, 50, 100 and 200 nodes, depending
on the probability of message loss. First, as one may expect
the empirical value of R increases with the probability of
message loss. Second, we observe that increasing the system’s
size decreases the value of R. This may appear unexpected,
however, it is due to the fact that nodes forward messages in
an all-to-all manner where messages can be probabilistically
lost. Therefore, message losses have a lower impact on the
broadcast delay in large scale systems. For example, with 90%
message losses, R is 41 (7) rounds with 10 (200) nodes resp.
To obtain the latency of RT-ByzCast, we empirically eval-
uate the worst case computational delay (dmax) needed per
node per round. This delay includes the time a node needs to
process all received messages and prepare the corresponding
messages to be sent. Nodes use the ecdsa-256 encryption
scheme [33], which is known for being fast and for having
relatively short signatures. The overall worst case latency of
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Figure 8. Total broadcast time depending on the system size and the message
loss probability.
RT-ByzCast would then be computed as 3 × R × dmax. We
illustrate this overall latency in Figure 8. We observed from
our experiments that having more Byzantine nodes in the
system puts a higher computing load on correct nodes. The
variations in Figure 8 for a given system size result from
two main factors: (i) the value of R increases with message
losses (Figure 7), and (ii) the value of dmax decreases with
higher message losses, depending on the maximum number
of simultaneously received messages per round. With low loss
rates (from 10−6 to 10−4 in Figure 8), a slight increase in
the value of R increases the broadcast time noticeably. As
message losses become more frequent (e.g., from 10−4 to 0.5)
the value of dmax decreases, reducing the broadcast delay,
until the value of R increases sufficiently to compensate and
increase again the broadcast time (e.g., from 0.5 to 0.9).
Our numbers in Figure 8 show that without any performance
optimizations, and despite message losses, RT-ByzCast can
meet the timing constraints of various applications, such as (i)
power system automation and substation automation applica-
tions (IEC 61850-5 standard [34]), e.g., transfer of automation
functions (TT3 class messages) ≈ 100 ms (systems size ≤ 50),
slow speed auto-control functions, time-tagged alarms, event
records, set-values read/write operations (TT4 class messages)
≤ 500 ms, (ii) continuous control (e.g. temperature-driven)
applications ≤ 1 s [20], and (iii) operator commands of
SCADA applications (≤ 2 s) [35].
However, we believe that RT-ByzCast’s latency has a sub-
stantial margin for improvement, whose avenues we discuss
in the conclusions.
VII. REVIVING PROCESSES IN THE Dead-State
In order to allow processes to leave the Dead-State,
we propose a modification to our RT-ByzCast algorithm.
A process pi that issues a broadcast at some round r
sends now RTBRB-broadcast(pi, r, v; Φpi) instead of
RTBRB-broadcast(pi, v; Φpi). In other words, pi includes
the round in which the broadcast is issued (first sent) in
the payload of the RTBRB-broadcast() message that pi
sends. The behavior of our RT-ByzCast algorithm of Sec-
tion V-B remains the same.
A process in the Dead-State mimics the behavior of a
crashed process in the fail-stop model [16]. However, unlike
an actual crashed process, a process pi in the Dead-State
continues to listen and process received messages. In other
words, a process pj that is in the Dead-State executes our
RT-ByzCast algorithm, however with the exception that pj
refrains from sending any message. If process pj (in the Dead-
State) detects that some value v relative to process pi has been
signed by at least 2f + 1 processes (i.e., |Recho(pi, r, v)| >
2f ), then pj performs a check: if the current round, rcur,
satisfies rcur − 2R > r, where r is the round in which
v was issued, then pj delivers the message v (if it has
not done so), shifts to the Alive-State. Then pj transmits
during every round in [rcur + 1, rcur + 1 + R] the message
Deliver((pi, r, v, sigs); ∗) and resumes as in Section V-B.
VIII. THE CASE OF A DYNAMIC SYSTEM
So far in the paper, we have discussed systems where the
maximum number of processes n is static and known to all
processes. In this section, we consider a dynamic system where
the maximum number of processes in the system is unknown,
as processes can randomly join and leave. For consistency,
as the system now allows processes to join at any point in
time, we assume the following: a process that transitions to the
Alive-State at round r is not required to deliver any messages
that were broadcast at rounds < r.
We consider that correct processes now can exist, at any
point in time, in one of three possible states: Alive-State, Dead-
State, and Pending-State. Only those processes that exist in
the Alive-State are the ones that should guarantee the RTBRB
properties. We assume that initially x > 3 processes exist and
are awakened by the clock initialization signal. We assume that
these processes constitute a trusted pool and that their identity
is known to any process that wishes to join the system later.
Some processes within the trusted pool, at most bx−13 c, can
be Byzantine. Our trusted pool can be viewed as a trusted
authority, which is a widely adopted assumption in Byzantine
group communication protocols [36], [37]. In fact, in the
absence of a centralized admission control scheme, a trusted
entity becomes a necessity for allowing joins in an intrusion-
tolerant system [38]. Processes in the trusted pool constitute
the initial system and execute our RT-ByzCast algorithm.
Hence, the total number of processes, n, is initially equal to
x (n however is not fixed). n is the number of processes that
exist in either the Alive-State or the Dead-State. We consider
that at any point in time at most f = bn−13 c can be Byzantine.
We assume that every process maintains a list ID that
contains the ids of the processes in the system. Initially the
ID list contains the ids of all processes in the trusted pool. A
process pj that wants to join the system at round r, initializes
its state to the Pending-State, sets n = x, and defines ID as
the list of ids of all processes in trusted pool.
pj begins to send at the beginning of every round in [r +
1, r + 1 + R] the heartbeat message, HB({pj , keyj , r}; Φpj),
to the processes in the trusted pool. Upon the receipt of a
HB({pj , keyj , r}; Φpj) in round r′ : r′ ∈ [r+ 1, r+ 1 +R] a
process pi in the trusted pool executes the following, if pi
is not sending some message for another potential joining
process. pi verifies the received heartbeat. Then pi creates
a Join({pj , keyj , r}{n, ID}; Φpj ,Φpi) message and sends
this message in rounds r′′ : r′′ ∈ [r′ + 1, r + 1 + R] it to all
processes in the trusted pool, and to pj as well.
If a process pk in the trusted pool receives
Join({pj , keyj , r}{n, ID}; Φpj , ...,Φpi) at some round
r′ : r′ ∈ [r + 1, r + 1 + R], pk verifies the message
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received and validates that the values of n and ID match
with its local values. Then, considering that SIG(pk),
contains the signatures that pk received so far relative to
{pj , keyj , r}{n, ID} (pk’s signature is included in SIG(pk)),
process pk executes SIG(pk) = SIG(pk)
⋃{Φpj , ...,Φpi}.
If SIG(pk) contains signatures from at least bx−13 c + 1
processes, then pk sends in rounds r′′ : r′′ ∈ [r′+1, r+1+R]
Join({pj , keyj , r}{n, ID};SIG(pk)) to all processes in
the trusted group and to pj as well.
The joining process pj also executes the same steps when re-
ceiving Join({pj , keyj , r}{n, ID}; Φpj , ...,Φpi) messages.
If at some round r′ ≤ r + 1 + R, SIG(pj) relative to
some (n, ID) contains signatures from at least 2bx−13 c + 1
processes in the trusted pool, pj transitions to the Alive-
State, updates its parameters accordingly (to be equivalent
to the new values of n + 1 and ID⋃ pj), and invokes
an RTBRB-broadcast(join(pj , keyj);Φpj). Otherwise,
i.e., if pj fails to collect enough signatures on some values
of n and ID by round r + 1 + R, then pj remains in the
Pending-State, quits sending any messages, and tries to join
the system again after a random duration elapses.
All processes that take part of the
RTBRB-broadcast(join(pj , keyj);Φpj) do not
count pj’s signature as part of any quorum (but simply
use it for verifying the validity of the message sent). Any
process that RTBRB-delivers(join(pj , keyj);*),
except pj , updates the set of public keys to include keyj
and the local parameters to n = n + 1 and f = bn−13 c,ID⋃ pj . That concludes the joining procedure for processes.
A process pl that wants to leave the system, issues an
RTBRB-broadcast(leave(pl, keyl);Φpl). pl remains
in the Alive-State until pl delivers the message relative
to its leave request broadcast, after which pl shifts to the
Dead-State. If it wishes, pl can join the system later.
IX. RT-BYZCAST POTENTIAL APPLICATION DOMAINS
The problem we address — disseminating information in
a real-time Byzantine-resilient manner given communication
synchrony disruptions — is of fundamental importance to any
critical distributed system seeking dependability and security
in the CPS context. RTBRB is important to, e.g., (1) achieve
a real-time common view of the state of the system by
independent processes, (2) distribute sensory information in
a coherent way or (3) help ensure the consistency of replicas
driving a same end-component, e.g., an actuator.
The difficulty of the problem lies in ensuring predictability
and resilience despite communication uncertainties, faults, and
attacks that hinder the synchronism needed to meet real-time
deadlines. In this sense, RT-ByzCast showcases an algorith-
mic design solution to circumvent the impossibilities that
prevent traditional modular distributed computing approaches
from achieving real-time Byzantine-resilient information dis-
semination. As a well-contained primitive, RT-ByzCast can
be integrated in implementations of existing systems and
frameworks, for example those related to distributed control
systems (DCSs) [39] which include monitoring and control
applications for factory automation, substation automation and
smart grids. In fact, real-time execution platforms for DCSs,
such as FASA [31], [40], have architectures that adhere to the
assumptions considered in this paper; thus RT-ByzCast can be
of substantial use to both the underlying system-monitoring
algorithms as well as to the control applications being run
(e.g., power control applications [20]). Other application sys-
tems include ship-board DCSs requiring distributed real-time
data services [41], [42], traffic control and agile manufacturing
that require “fresh” data reflecting real-world status [41]–[44],
and multi-gateway SmartData construct protocols for CPSs on
Wireless Sensor Networks or on the Internet of Things [45].
X. RELATED WORK
The work in this paper has evolved from both [46] and [26],
in what concerns the timing/synchrony aspect. In [46], it
was assumed that all non-faulty processes remain connected
synchronously, regardless of any process and network failures.
This strong assumption about the network was too ideal, in
terms of scale and timing behaviour. This resulted in a poor
performance in practice (latency of ≈ 20 s) that limit [46]’s
application areas. The limited performance is mainly attributed
to deterministic network model (which in turn affected the
solution design). Moreover, the system model in [46] did
not allow processes that malfunction (violates assumptions)
to know that they are being treated as faulty by the model.
In contrast, RT-ByzCast provides latencies in the range of
milliseconds (from few to few hundreds depending on system
size and message loss). We achieve this performance gain by
forcing processes to operate within the needed delays: we
exclude processes that are incapable of meeting the desired
timing requirements. Moreover, in our model, processes that
violate timeliness assumptions transition to the Dead State and
hence are aware of their “non-correctness” (in terms of time).
In [26], the timeliness problem was addressed by what
the authors called weak-fail-silence: despite the capability of
the transmission medium to deliver messages reliably and in
real-time, the protocol should not be agnostic of potential
timing or omission faults (even if sporadic). This notion was
embedded in a bounded omission specification that weakens
the basic fail-silence (crash) hypothesis. In our paper, we make
a significant advance, by taking a further step: providing these
reliable real-time communication guarantees, in environments
with much higher uncertainty levels (faults and attacks). In
fact, the bounded omissions assumption of [26] could not
be taken as is, if we were to tolerate such higher and more
uncertain fault sets (as we consider): it could easily lead to
system unavailability in faulty periods.
The rest of the literature on broadcast primitives, to the
best of our knowledge, either does not take into account
timeliness and maliciousness or addresses them separately. We
next summarize few such related works.
A. Byzantine Reliable Communication
In order to withstand unpredictable security threats and soft-
ware unreliability arising within networks, various works have
investigated how to provide a reliable broadcast capable of
tolerating arbitrary process behavior. A celebrated algorithm in
distributed computing is that of Bracha and Toueg [14], which
implements reliable broadcast in an asynchronous system of
n processes with at most f < n3 Byzantine processes (proved
to be an upper bound on the number of tolerable Byzantine
processes [13], [14]). The broadcast algorithm of [14], similar
to the one proposed in this paper, relies on echoing enough
messages before delivering a value. Later works tried to
further optimize this algorithm, e.g., in terms of the total
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number of asynchronous communication rounds needed for
termination [15]. On a different level Obenshain et al. [47]
design and construct an intrusion-tolerant overlay capable of
tolerating Byzantine actions, based on the key understanding
that no overlay node should be trusted or given preference.
The authors use a maximal topology with minimal weights to
prevent routing attacks at the overlay level and rely on source
routing augmented with redundant dissemination methods to
limit the effect of compromised forwarder processes.
Unlike our RT-ByzCast algorithm, the solutions of [13]–
[15], [47] do not provide timeliness guarantees on message
delivery, even when applied to weakly synchronous networks
such as the one we consider in this paper.
B. Timeliness Communication Guarantees
Given the need for predictable responsiveness in various
applications today, many efforts have been made to devise
timely broadcast (or routing/communication) algorithms, i.e.,
communication protocols with known fixed delays.
Timeliness on web communication, for example, has been
addressed in content distribution networks [48], [49] such as
Akamai [50]. The concept behind such distribution networks
is to place data in a close geographical proximity from its
consumers and hence minimize latency. In a slightly different
context, timeliness has been also addressed at the level of
data center networks [51], [52]. The proposed solutions in
this area mainly advocate modifications of network devices.
Bessani et al. propose Jiter [9], an application-layer routing, as
a means to provide message latency and reliability assurances
for control traffic in wide-area IP networks. Jiter routes dead-
line constrained control messages using an overlay network
created on top of multi-homed communication infrastructure.
Babay et al. [10] present an overlay transport service that
can provide highly reliable communication while meeting
stringent timeliness guarantees. Their scheme relies on an
analysis of real-world network data, upon which they develop
timely dissemination graphs and specify targeted redundant
transmissions to timeliness and reliability.
Existing efforts have also investigated providing end-to-
end guarantees in networks. Jacob et al. [2] propose an
approach to integrate a wireless real-time communication
protocol into CPS. Their approach decouples communication
from application tasks. They devise a protocol based on
dynamically establishing contracts between source/destination
devices and the networking protocol. Another set of protocols
known as resource reservation protocols (RSVP) combine
flow specification, resource reservation, admission control, and
packet scheduling to achieve end-to-end QoS [53]. Relying
on software-defined networks, Kumar et al. [54] propose a
framework that synthesizes network paths which can meet the
requisite delay requirements for real-time flows.
On a different level Guerraoui at al. [20] devise an algorithm
that allows processes to communicate in timely fashion via a
real-time distributed shared memory (DSM). Using their DSM,
write operations of a correct process become consistently
visible to all alive processes within a known fixed delay. Their
approach relies on bundling data messages with control traffic,
namely traffic relative to the failure detector component used
for monitoring processes in distributed control systems.
However, all above solutions [2], [9], [10], [20], [48]–[54],
unlike RT-ByzCast, cannot handle malicious process behavior
and hence would fail if any process is compromised.
XI. CONCLUSION
This paper studied how to realize the RTBRB abstraction: a
real-time Byzantine-resilient reliable broadcast in the presence
of unbounded communication losses and delays. We first
showed that implementing RTBRB is challenging and in
fact is impossible under traditional paradigms that consider
failure detection mechanisms working independently of the
distributed algorithms. To circumvent it, we proposed RT-
ByzCast, an algorithm that deploys temporal and spatial diffu-
sion of messages, and signature aggregation in a sliding time-
window to mask losses and track process connectivity. RT-
ByzCast bounds network timing uncertainties by reconciling
two mechanisms: cooperative round-based message retrans-
mission involving all processes; and proactive self-crashing of
misbehaving processes.
We proved that RT-ByzCast indeed implements the desired
RTBRB abstraction and we showed that it does so robustly
and efficiently: we evaluated the reliability of our algorithm,
showing that it can tolerate quite high loss rates (≈ 60%)
whilst still delivering the real-time service and ensuring a
negligible probability that any correct process crashes itself,
hence guaranteeing system survivability. We also showed that
RT-ByzCast meets the timing constraints expected by a wide
range of CPS and IoT applications, whose latency require-
ments are normally inversely proportional to the system size:
RTBRB delays are in the order of the dozens of milliseconds
on average, ranging from few milliseconds to hundreds of
milliseconds, as system size goes from 10 to 200 nodes.
Furthermore, RT-ByzCast design and minimal environment
assumptions, simplify its integration in existing architectures.
By providing the first solution to the RTBRB problem
in environments where synchrony constraints co-exist with
maliciousness, the objective of this paper has been met: dis-
covering and proving impossibility results countering common
beliefs about failure detection, which will guide future research
in these environments, as well as developing algorithms to
circumvent them which, whilst non-optimised, already provide
suitable performance for real world CPS/IoT applications.
However, we believe RT-ByzCast’s latency has a substantial
margin for improvement, to meet more demanding timeliness
needs, still in large scale system deployments. We plan to
address these optimisations in future work, such as using gos-
sip paradigms to decrease the nodes’ transmission costs, and
using multisignature/aggregate signature schemes to amortize
the costs of signatures.
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APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
Intuitively, Theorem 1 follows from Theorem 2, so we
prove in this section Theorem 2. We prove that it is im-
possible for an algorithm A that can obtain L (the list of
non-suspected processes) to implement RTBRB-Validity and
RTBRB-Timeliness, when A cannot change which processes
are in L.
By contradiction assume that an algorithm A imple-
ments RTBRB-Validity and RTBRB-Timeliness. The ∆ of
the RTBRB-Timeliness is a fixed duration; hence any process
can send a finite number of messages within that ∆, e.g.,
M messages. We now compute the probability that a correct
process pi ∈ L loses all M messages sent to another process
in L. Recall that Pij(t) is the probability that link lij loses a
message at time t ∀i 6= j. Let Pij(t ∩ t′) be the probability
that link lij loses the messages (if any is sent) at time t and
time t′. Since 0 < Pij(t) ≤ 1 ∀t, then
0 < Pij(t) =
Pij(t ∩ t′)
Pij(t′|t) ≤ 1 ∀ t
′, t. (3)
By (3), Pij(t′|t) > 0 (and 0 < Pij(t∩ t′) ≤ 1). By induction,
we have Pij(t′|t, t1, ..., tx) > 0 ∀ t′ > t, tx. Denote by Bij(t)
the event that link lij loses all messages (if any is sent) during
the interval t+ ∆. Let tx denote the times at which pi sends
a message in [t+ ∆]. The probability of Bij(t) happening is:
Pr(Bij(t)) = Pij(t1 ∩ t2 ∩ ... ∩ tM )
= Pij(t1)× Pij(t2|t1)× ...× Pij(tM |t1, ..., tM−1) > 0.
Given 0 < Pij(t) ≤ 1 ∀t and Pij(t′|t, t1, ..., tx) > 0
∀ t′ > t, tx, then we have 0 < Pr(Bij(t)) ≤ 1; there
is a positive probability that the link connecting pi to pj
(pi, pj ∈ L) loses all messages sent by pi in any finite duration.
Assuming independence between links, then there is a positive
probability that all messages sent by pi in any duration ∆ and
to any finite number of processes are lost. Assume that pi
is the process that invokes a broadcast. By RTBRB-Validity
pi delivers its own message. However, no other process in L
can deliver with probability 1, pi’s message within any fixed
duration after being broadcast.
APPENDIX B
RT-ByzCast PROOF OF CORRECTNESS
We prove in what follows that our RT-ByzCast algorithm
guarantees all RTBRB properties (defined in Section III).
A. RTBRB-Validity
Consider that a correct process pi broadcasts message m at
round r.
Lemma 1. At round r + R, either: (i) pi can verify that at
least 2f + 1 processes received its broadcast message, or (ii)
pi crashes itself.
Proof. pi is a non-Byzantine process and hence it does not
send different messages (relative to some broadcast instance)
to different processes. By Case 1 of Definition 7, pi crashes
itself in any round rcurr ≥ r + R, if pi has received ≤ 2f
distinct signatures (including its own) on messages echoed
from its broadcast. Therefore, at round r+R, pi either crashes
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itself (hence pi is no longer correct) or has at least 2f + 1
process signatures.
Validity is a property that concerns a correct sender, hence
the case when pi does not crash itself. Following from
Lemma 1, if pi does not crash itself by round r + R, then
pi can verify that at least 2f + 1 processes received its
broadcast message, in which case (lines 25-27 of Algorithm 2)
pi executes Function 4. Accordingly pi delivers m and begins
to send deliver messages as of round r + R+ 1 (lines 1-4 of
Function 4).
Following from Case 2 of Definition 7, pi remains correct
(does not crash itself) at round r + 2R+ 1 if at least 2f + 1
processes sign its deliver message. In other words, message
m which is broadcast by a correct process pi (that does not
crash itself within [r, r+3R]) is eventually delivered by some
correct process (in this case pi itself), proving validity.
B. RTBRB-No Duplication
A process pj in our RT-ByzCast algorithm delivers a mes-
sage m broadcast by pi, if and if only if pj has not previously
delivered any m relative to pi. This is ensured by line 1 of
Function 4.
C. RTBRB-Integrity
Assume that pj is a correct process that delivers a mes-
sage m relative to a correct process pi. By lines 25-27 of
Algorithm 2, this is possible only if pj received on some
Echo((pi,m)...) message signatures relative to at least 2f+1
processes.
This means at least f + 1 correct processes are trans-
mitting some Echo((pi,m)...) messages In our algo-
rithm, a process pk transmits an echo message with sender
pi and message m in two cases: (a) if pk receives a
RTBRB-broadcast((pi,m), ...) message from pi itself
(lines 8-11 of algorithm 2), or (b) if pk receives some
Echo((pi,m)...) message signed by pi (lines 13-24 of Al-
gorithm 2).
In both cases (a) and (b), pk is sure that pi did indeed
broadcast m.
D. RTBRB-Agreement
Lemma 2 (No two correct processes deliver different mes-
sages). If a correct process p delivers message m and a correct
process q delivers message m′, then m = m′.
Proof. By lines (32-34 and 45-48 of Algorithm 2), any process
that executes the deliver-message() function to deliver a mes-
sage m of pi should have m signed by at least 2f+1 processes.
In our algorithm a correct process appends its signature to m
(signs m) if it is not echoing any message other than m. In
other words, a correct process never appends its signature to
two messages m and m′ such that m 6= m′. Any set of 2f+1
processes has at least one correct process in common. This
means that no two correct processes deliver different messages
m and m′ (where m 6= m′) of pi.
Lemma 3. If some correct process pj delivers message m then
all correct processes eventually deliver some message m′.
Proof. Let pj be the only process that delivers message m,
say at round r. From Function 4, pj starts to send only
Deliverpj((m)) messages from round r+ 1 till round r+
1+2R. At the end of round r+1+R process pj crashes itself if
it does not receive Deliver...((m)) signed by at least 2f+1
processes (Case 2 of Definition 7). Since pj is considered to
be correct (hence does not crash itself), then this means that
at least 2f + 1 processes have received Deliver...((m))
by round r + 1 + R. By lines 51-60 of Algorithm 2 any
correct process that receives Deliver...((m)) delivers (has
delivered) some message. this means that from round r+1+R
till round r+1+2R (included) at least f+1 correct processes
send only Deliverpj((...)) messages. Thus, all other correct
processes can gather at most 2f signatures on any messages
sent during [r+ 1 +R, r+ 1 + 2R] (in which case they crash
themselves by Case 4 of Definition 7), unless they receive
some Deliverpj((m)). If they receive Deliverpj((m))
they deliver message m. Hence all correct processes (non-
Byzantine processes that do not crash themselves) deliver
some message.
The proof follows then from Lemma 2 and Lemma 3.
E. RTBRB-Timeliness
Consider that a non-Byzantine process pi broadcasts mes-
sage m at round r. and Assume that pi is correct, that is pi
does not crash itself in [r, r + ∆].
Lemma 4. If a correct process pi broadcasts a message m at
round r, then at least f + 1 correct processes receive m by
round r + R.
Proof. Following from Lemma 1, at round r+R, pi can verify
that at least 2f + 1 processes have received its broadcast,
otherwise pi crashes itself. In other words, if pi is still alive
at round r+R, then this means that at least 2f + 1 processes
received pi’s broadcast message out of which at least f + 1
are correct.
Since process pi at round r+R collected 2f+1 signatures,
it delivers m as indicated by Function 4 (lines 30-35 of
Algorithm 2).
Lemma 5. If a correct process pi broadcasts a message m
at round r, then at least f + 1 correct processes deliver m by
round r + 2R.
Proof. By lines (2-4) of Function 4 pi sends only
Deliver(m) messages in all rounds ∈ [r+1+R, r+1+3R].
For pi not to crash itself (Case 2 of Definition 7) pi needs to
collect 2f + 1 signatures on its Deliver(m) message by
round r+ 1 + 2R. This means if pi is does not crash itself by
end of round r+ 1 + 2R, then at least f + 1 correct processes
have received and signed p′is Deliver(m) message by round
r + 2R. By lines (51-59) of Algorithm 2 all such correct
processes deliver m at lastest by round r + 2R.
Following from Lemma 5, there exists at most f other
correct processes at round r+ 2R that may have not delivered
m.
Lemma 6. If a correct process pi broadcasts a message m at
round r, then all correct processes that have not delivered m
by round r + 2R deliver m by round r + 3R.
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Proof. Any process that delivers m at some round r′, sends
only Deliver(m) messages in all rounds ∈ [r′, r′ + 2R]
(lines 51-59 of Algorithm 2 and lines 2-4 of Function 4).
Hence following from Lemma 1 and Lemma 5, in all rounds
[r+ 1 + 2R, r+ 1 + 3R], at least f + 1 correct processes only
send Deliver(m) messages. Hence the rest of the correct
processes (at most f ) that have not delivered m yet would (i)
crash themselves at r + 1 + 3R by Case 3 of Definition 7, or
(ii) deliver m since they heard a message from some of the
f + 1 correct processes that already delivered m.
As such, correct processes (that do not crash themselves)
deliver message m from pi by round r+ 3R. Hence, RTBRB-
Timeliness is satisfied with ∆ = 3R.
APPENDIX C
CORRELATED LINK LOSSES
We now study the effect of correlated losses/omissions. To
this end, we assume that links now may exhibit time-correlated
losses/omissions, which might result in bursts.
We specifically simulate links following the Gilbert-Elliot
(GE) model [55], [56]. The GE model, consisting of two
states (see Fig. 9), is a simple non-trivial finite state Markov
chain (FSMC) [57], established to capture well message loss
behavior [58]–[60]. In fact, the GE model has been empirically
verified, by a large body of work [56], [58], [61]–[64], as a
good approximation of message losses in real-life communi-
cation scenarios. The GE model, for instance, has been used to
model losses in wireless media IEEE 802.11 [64], wired power
line networks [65] and other hybrid networks [66], [67]. The
two states of the GE model (Fig. 9), noted by good and bad,
can for example abstract the following: the communication
link between a pair of processes occupies the bad state when
the packet success-rate drops below a certain “unacceptable”
threshold or when communication delays become slower than
expected (e.g., > d); the link occupies the good state oth-
erwise. At any round, the link can be in exactly one of the
two states: the good state or the bad state. A link in the good
state delivers messages (if any is sent) in a reliably and timely
fashion; however, if the link is in the bad state then messages
are either lost or delayed (> d). In other words messages sent
on a link, which is in the bad state, are omitted. Every link
transitions across rounds, i.e., at the beginning of every round
a link moves to its new state, which can be the same state it
existed in or the other state.
S RChannel
Good Bad
α
β
1-β 1-α
ΜΝ    Μ2 Μ1
p
p
1-p
1-p
S RChannel
Good Bad
α
β
1-β 1-α
ΜΝ    Μ2 Μ1
Figure 9. A time-varying communication link under the 2-state GE model
For example, given the link is in the good state at some
round, it will remain in the same state at the next round
with probability 1 − β and will move to the bad state with
probability β. Similarly if the link state is bad at some
round, it will remain bad at the next round with probability
(1− α) and will shift to good with probability α. Since links
transition according to the transition probabilities (i.e., α and
β), different links can exist in different states in a given round,
even if all links start from the same state and are governed by
the same α and β.
We run our simulations again given the same
|C| ∈ {5, 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 100, 200} processes but
now considering the various transition probabilities (α, β) ∈
{(0.8, 10−6); (0.7, 10−5); (0.6, 10−3); (0.5, 10−2); (0.4, 0.1);
(0.3, 0.4); (0.2, 0.6); (0.1, 0.7)}. Namely, we assume that all
links have the same transition probabilities and start from
the good state. Every link then transitions to a new state
at the beginning of every round. We select values of α and
β satisfying the positive correlation condition (a.k.a. bursty
condition) [68], which requires that (1− β) > α. In fact, we
show in Figure 10 the probability of having bursts of various
lengths under our selected values of transition probabilities.
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Figure 10. The probability of bursts of variable lengths under different
transition probabilities (α and β).
For a given value of |C| and (α, β), we invoke a broadcast
at one of the processes and record, after R rounds of commu-
nication, if any process does not receive |C| signatures on the
value being broadcast. We repeat such an instance 106 times.
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Figure 11. The probability of a correct process crashing itself in a system
after 10 communication rounds (R = 5) under correlated link losses.
We report our results showing:
num. of instances in which some correct process crashes itself
106 ,
for R ∈ {5, 6, 10, 15} rounds respectively. We select these
values of R to show that, despite loss correlation, a well
chosen value of the slack window still allows our RT-ByzCast
algorithm to provide the intended reliability.
Our results in Figure 11, Figure 12, Figure 13, and Figure 14
show similar conclusions as the case of independent message
loss. Namely, the probability of a correct process crashing it-
self decreases (1) as the number of non-Byzantine processes in
the system increases, and (2) as the number of communication
rounds (i.e., the value of R) increases.
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Figure 12. The probability of a correct process crashing itself in a system
after 10 communication rounds (R = 6) under correlated link losses.
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Figure 13. The probability of a correct process crashing itself in a system
after 10 communication rounds (R = 10) under correlated link losses.
APPENDIX D
RELIABILITY EVALUATION
In this section we illustrate the probability of a correct
process shutting down. Unlike the graphs in Section VI.A,
we fix |C| and vary the window size (R). Our results in
Figure 15, Figure 16, Figure 17, and Figure 18 show that
increasing the number of communication rounds (i.e., the value
of R) increases the reliability of our RT-ByzCast algorithm
for any number of correct processes. In fact, with R = 10
the probability of a process crashing itself becomes negligible
even with up to 60% losses/omissions rate.
APPENDIX E
RT-ByzCast BANDWIDTH CONSUMPTION
Finally, we evaluated the protocol’s peak bandwidth con-
sumption, both in terms of reception and in emission. Fig-
ure 19 and Figure 20 respectively present the peak bandwidth
consumptions during the broadcast of 128 bits and 1 Mbits
messages, depending on the message loss probability. We
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Figure 14. The probability of a correct process crashing itself in a system
after 15 communication rounds (R = 15) under correlated link losses.
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Figure 15. The probability of a correct process crashing itself in a system of
|C| = 5 w.r.t. a varying number communication rounds.
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Figure 16. The probability of a correct process crashing itself in a system of
|C| = 20 w.r.t. a varying number communication rounds.
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Figure 17. The probability of a correct process crashing itself in a system of
|C| = 50 w.r.t. a varying number communication rounds..
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Figure 18. The probability of a correct process crashing itself in a system of
|C| = 200 w.r.t. a varying number communication rounds..
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observed that correct nodes are using more bandwidth when
there are Byzantine nodes in the system. We therefore present
the bandwidth consumptions when the system contains the
maximum number of Byzantine nodes tolerated. We use plain
lines to represent the nodes’ bandwidth usage in reception,
and dashed lines for their bandwidth usage in emission. For
a given system size, the difference between those two lines is
due to message losses, and is accentuated by the presence of
Byzantine nodes.
From these figures, we could make two observations. First,
as expected, the nodes’ bandwidth consumption increases with
the system’s size and with the message’s size. Second, the
bandwidth consumptions of nodes tend to decrease when the
message loss probabilities increase. For example, Figure 19
shows that broadcasting a 128 bits message in a system of 100
nodes consume around 1.9 Mbits in emission, and less than
1.1 Mbits in reception. Comparatively, broadcasting a larger
1 Mbits message in a system of 100 nodes consume less than
100 Mbits in emission, and less than 75 Mbits in reception.
Those numbers were obtained without any optimizations, and
we leave for future works the improvement of RTByzCast’s
bandwidth consumption. Possible ideas include reducing the
nodes’ fanout, decreasing the bandwidth’s footprint of digital
signatures, and the avoidance of redundant messages.
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Figure 19. Total broadcast delay for a 128 bits-message depending on the
number of nodes and the probability of message losses.
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Figure 20. Total broadcast delay for a 1 Mbits-message depending on the
number of nodes and the probability of message losses.
